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Abstract. One of the central assumptions of cognitive therapy is that psychological disor-
ders are caused, at least in part, by dysfunctional beliefs. One of the goals of therapy is
therefore to modify these beliefs or to replace them by more adaptive ones. Among other
treatments, this cognitive strategy has proved clinically successful in a number of cases. The
efficacy of belief modification in cognitive therapy raises a number of theoretical and con-
ceptual issues for behavior analysis. I discuss some of the attending difficulties and suggest
a possible way out.
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Resumen. Uno de los supuestos en que se basa la terapia cognitiva es que los trastornos psi-
cológicos son provocados, por lo menos en parte, por creencias disfuncionales. Por lo tanto,
uno de los objetivos de la terapia es modificar estas creencias o substituirlas por otras, más
adaptativas. Entre otros tratamientos, esta estrategia cognitiva se ha mostrado efectiva en
numerosos casos. La eficacia de la modificación de las creencias plantea varias cuestiones
teóricas y conceptuales para el análisis de las conductas. En este artículo se abordan algu-
nas de las dificultades que presenta y se avanzan algunas posibles soluciones.
Palabras clave: entorno, operante, filosofía, molar, terapia cognitiva.
Cognitive-behavioral therapy includes a variety
of approaches, theories, and treatments. Some of
them have been conceived as a relatively direct
application of Pavlovian and operant techniques,
whereas other stem from cognitive approaches to
psychological functioning (Butler, Chapman,
Forman, & Beck, 2006). Still others attempt to inte-
grate cognitive and behavioral perspectives under
the label of a new, third wave of therapy (Hayes,
2004). Certainly cognitive approaches to clinical
psychology seem different, at least on surface, from
behavioral orientations that focus on the use of oper-
ant reinforcement principles (Brewin, 1988).
Regardless of the eventual success of competing
clinical approaches, the issue arises of the relation
between cognitive treatments and behavioral ones.
Do they involve different processes of clinical
change (and if so, which ones?), or do they rely on
common principles?
In this commentary I raise a number of theoretical
questions with respect to the behavioral analysis of
belief modification in cognitive therapy. (My per-
spective is not that of a practicing clinician but that
of a behavior analyst interested in philosophical
issues.) In particular, I address the possible role of
operant reinforcement in the clinical changes that
are brought about during cognitive therapy (e.g.,
Beck, Rush, Shaw, & Emery, 1979). Can the operant
approach deal with belief modification during cog-
nitive therapy? What kind of behavioral concepts, if
any, are most adequate to deal with the clinical
changes that result from therapeutic techniques such
as cognitive questioning or logical challenges to a
patient’s beliefs (Beck, 1995)?
I will argue that a strictly behavioral analysis of
cognitive modification is unlikely to succeed as longCorrespondence concerning this article should be addressed toFrançois Tonneau, E-mail:  ftonneau@psi.uminho.pt
as this analysis is formulated in operant terms. To a
large extent, the failure of operant concepts with
respect to belief modification in cognitive therapy
reflects similar limitations with respect to behavior
analysis as a whole (Kantor, 1970). The concept of
reinforcement, while legitimate when dealing with a
restricted set of behavioral phenomena, fails to
apply to others and therefore cannot fulfill a basic,
integrative role in behavior theory (Malone, 1978).
By criticizing overextensions of the notion of rein-
forcement, however, I do not wish to imply that
operant concepts have no use in therapy or that clin-
ical psychologists should stop examining the conse-
quences of their patient’s symptoms. The in-session
reinforcement linked to natural social dynamics can
certainly be put to good use in promoting the thera-
peutic process (see Valero, Ferro, Kohlenberg, &
Tsai, this issue). Nevertheless, not all of the clinical
interactions that lead to significant clinical change
involve reinforcement. Those that promote thera-
peutic change through non-operant means raise spe-
cial difficulties for behavior analysis. I do not claim
to resolve any of them, but theoretical difficulties
are better examined than ignored, and they can be
informative with respect to future developments.
Efficacy of Cognitive Therapy
The very distinction between behavioral and cog-
nitive forms of therapy may be challenged on prag-
matic grounds. Therapies that are commonly classi-
fied as cognitive, such as Beck’s (1991, 1993) or
Ellis’ (1969, 1991), have always involved explicitly
behavioral components (e.g., Ellis, 1980, p. 336).
Conversely, a treatment known otherwise as behav-
ioral may include components that are arguably cog-
nitive. In Dimidjian et al.’s (2006) version of behav-
ioral activation, for example, “patients are encour-
aged to notice when they are ruminating and to
move their attention away from the content of rumi-
native thoughts” (p. 668).
The distinction between the behavioral and cogni-
tive components of cognitive behavior therapy can
be further challenged on theoretical grounds. The
cognitive therapists that use behavioral components
as part of a cognitive treatment package often
assume that the behavioral procedures are effective
because they modify cognitive processes (e.g.,
Clark, 2005). Conversely, some behavior analysts
assume that cognitive treatments achieve their
effects through behavioral processes such as rein-
forcement or extinction. Finally, one may even
reject any conceivable distinction between cognition
and behavior, arguing that the difference is not one
of nature but merely of accessibility to third parties
(e.g., Wilson, Hayes, & Gifford, 1997), so that cog-
nition is just behavior of a private or covert kind.
The distinction I will make in this commentary
concerns cognitive and behavioral procedures and is
purely conventional. Some therapeutic procedures
are commonly described as “behavioral,” whereas
others are commonly described as “cognitive” (e.g.,
Chambless & Ollendick, 2001). Exposure with
response prevention might be a typical example of
the former, and Socratic questioning a typical exam-
ple of the latter. The distinction, then, is made for
convenience and should not be taken to imply that
“cognitive” and “behavioral” techniques necessary
involve different operative principles. (In fact I will
argue that the processes responsible for the success
of cognitive treatment strategies are behavioral,
although non operant.)
Evaluating the clinical benefits of any therapeutic
strategy, cognitive or otherwise, is fraught with dif-
ficulties. The efficacy of a treatment package deter-
mined through randomized controlled trials, for
example, may differ from the effectiveness of this
treatment in the clinical population at large
(Seligman, 1995). Focusing on dichotomous deci-
sions (is a treatment empirically validated or not?)
or win-lose comparisons among treatment packages
may also mask the theoretical complexity of therapy
evaluation (Westen & Bradley, 2005). Controlled
comparisons among treatments administered to dif-
ferent groups of patients, for example, may lead to
an overemphasis on statistical significance over
clinical significance (Jacobson, Roberts, Berns, &
McGlinchey, 1999).
With these qualifications in mind, cognitive
behavioral treatments have documented their effica-
cy in addressing a wide range of disorders or prob-
lems (e.g., Butler et al., 2006; DeRubeis & Crits-
Christoph, 1998). In the case of depression, for
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example, cognitive behavior therapy produces
enduring effects over those of psychoactive medica-
tion (Hollon, Stewart, & Strunk, 2006).
Establishing the efficacy of the more specifically
cognitive components of a cognitive-behavioral
treatment package has often proved more difficult,
however. The very fact that most cognitive behav-
ioral treatments involve components of both kinds
(Beck, Rush, Shaw, & Emery, 1979) implies that
ordinary clinical practice cannot disentangle their
differential effects (if any). The few studies aimed at
separating the effects of cognitive components from
behavioral ones have not proved any notable advan-
tage of the former. Thus, in a well-known component
analysis of therapy for depression (Jacobson et al.,
1996), a full treatment package that included both
behavioral activation and cognitive modification of
the patients’ core beliefs (e.g., Beck, 2005) did not
perform any better than behavioral activation alone.
Negative results like those of Jacobson et al.
(1996) have lead some clinicians to question
whether adding cognitive components to behavioral
ones is ever necessary in therapy (Clark, 2005;
Longmore & Worrell, 2007). That the addition of
cognitive components to behavioral ones may prove
superfluous, however, does not imply that cognitive
strategies have no efficacy in and of themselves. In
Jacobson et al.’s study, their efficacy may have been
preempted by the previous implementation of
behavioral components. As Longmore and Worrell
(2007) suggest, “psychological states comprise
interacting cognitive, affective, behavioral and
physiological elements. Any treatment which effec-
tively targets one of these systems may lead to a
change in all of them” (p. 184).
More importantly, a number of studies have doc-
umented the clinical efficacy of cognitive tech-
niques in the absence of behavioral components.
Consider, for example, cognitive therapy for delu-
sions, a therapeutic strategy which relies mainly on
Socratic questioning and the empirical testing of
delusional beliefs (Turkington & Siddle, 1998).
Cognitive questioning has been shown to reduce
belief conviction (Chadwick, Lowe, Horne, &
Higson, 1994), strength of delusion and distress
(Chadwick & Birchwood, 1994), and compliance
with hallucinatory commands (Trower et al., 2004)
in patients diagnosed with symptoms of schizophre-
nia. In each case, cognitive treatment of delusion
was implemented with concurrent medication but
without accompanying behavioral procedures (such
as reinforcement for non-compliance). By contrast
with the mixed cognitive and behavioral compo-
nents in the treatment of depression (Jacobson et al.,
1996), the positive results on delusions strongly sug-
gest that cognitive procedures have a clinical effica-
cy of their own.
The processes responsible for the efficacy of cog-
nitive procedures may differ entirely from those
trained through strictly behavioral treatments.
Alternatively, both sets of processes may coincide or
even fully overlap. The common-factor school of
psychotherapy (e.g., Wampold, 2007) emphasizes
the latter possibility, with the efficacy of all treat-
ments (cognitive or otherwise) attributed to shared
basic processes theorized in terms of therapeutic
alliance, catharsis, the acquisition of new behaviors,
or positive expectancies (Grencavage & Norcross,
1990). In favor of their approach, proponents of the
common-factor interpretation of therapeutic success
often point out that demonstrating the superiority of
a psychological treatment over another has proved
difficult (Wampold et al., 1997).
The hypothesis that all bona fide psychotherapies
are empirically equivalent has been debated, howev-
er (Crits-Christoph, 1997), especially with regard to
the fit between particular disorders and particular
treatments (Chambless, 2002), as opposed to a meta-
analytic evaluation averaged across all outcomes.
For the present argument, the demonstration that
cognitive procedures are efficacious with respect to
at least some disorders (e.g., Trower et al., 2004) is
enough to proceed. The extent of the overlap
between the processes engaged through behavioral
and cognitive procedures should be a matter of fur-
ther discussion; there is no theory-free resolution of
this issue, since it depends on theoretical choices
about the nature of therapeutic change.
Belief Modification: Practice and Theory
The cognitive components of a successful thera-
peutic package vary across situations and from clini-
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cian to clinician. Beck (1995) provides both a set of
guidelines for the implementation of cognitive ther-
apy and an overview of the theoretical concepts
through which the results and procedures are to be
interpreted. Cognitive therapy typically assumes
complex causal relations among a variety of mental,
emotional, physiological, and behavioral compo-
nents (e.g., Alford & Beck, 1997). Within the cogni-
tive domain, Beck (1995, p. 16) distinguishes core
beliefs, intermediate beliefs, and automatic
thoughts. Core beliefs are the most abstract, perva-
sive ones and are acquired during early development
and education. They organize a person’s cognitive
life at its most central level. Intermediate beliefs
consist of mid-level rules, attitudes, and assump-
tions that guide perception and a person’s interpreta-
tion of the current situation. Automatic thoughts are
situation-specific and result in current behavioral,
emotional, and physiological reactions (pp. 15-22).
In the case of a depressed patient, for example,
automatic thoughts often trigger negative mood
changes. The therapist trained to detect these
changes can probe them in session, at the very
moment they occur, so as to uncover the underlying
cognition. Patients can also be encouraged to moni-
tor their own automatic thoughts outside of the clin-
ical session (Beck, 1995, pp. 125-136). From then
on, therapy moves progressively from the most
superficial or accessible cognitions (automatic
thoughts) to the more central or deeper ones (core
beliefs). The “downward arrow technique,” for
example, starts from an automatic thought in order
to identify its underlying meaning and eventually
uncover a more abstract belief (p. 145).
Having identified a dysfunctional belief, “the
therapist mentally devises a new, more realistic and
functional belief and guides the patient toward it”
(Beck, 1995, p. 175). Intermediate as well as core
beliefs are modified through techniques such as
Socratic questioning, examining pros and cons,
rational-emotional role playing, and behavioral
experiments designed to test whether a belief is
actually valid or not. Cognitive disputing can take
on a variety of styles, especially in rational-emotive
therapy (DiGiuseppe, 1991). Aside from rational
arguments, the therapist may attempt to modify
beliefs through metaphor or humor. In all cases, the
therapeutic aim is to uncover incongruities in the
patient’s current belief system and thereby to replace
dysfunctional cognitions by more adaptive ones.
Whereas the belief modification procedures used
in cognitive therapy were first formulated independ-
ently from basic research, efforts at theorizing clini-
cal change in cognitive terms have been continuing
(Alford & Beck, 1997), and progress has been made
in integrating basic and applied cognitive psycholo-
gy (Brewin, 1988). Cognitive therapists assume that
a person’s beliefs are acquired through experience
(early experience in the case of core beliefs) and
then sensitized and activated by life events.
Accordingly, a cognitive theory of belief acquisition
is necessary a theory of memory, and memory theo-
ry has proved increasingly relevant to modern cog-
nitive therapy (e.g., Ehlers & Clark, 2000). What
happens in cognitive therapy should be consistent
with cognitive theories about the acquisition of
memory structures and the modification of schemat-
ic knowledge through novel experience (Brewin,
1988, pp. 171-175).
As in traditional network models of memory (e.g.,
Anderson and Bower, 1973), the theory underlying
cognitive therapy assumes knowledge structures
arranged in a hierarchy of different levels of acces-
sibility and abstraction (e.g., Teasdale, 1996).
Postulating different levels of knowledge abstrac-
tion and remoteness from behavioral responses has
an important implication with respect to language:
expressing a thought or belief during therapy is not
simply a case of “turning up the auditory stereo
channel so that the therapist can hear what the client
is thinking” (Bernard, 1981, p. 131). Although some
of the patient’s cognitions may be identified with
covert verbal responses, others may not (Teasdale,
1996). An important portion of the patient’s thinking
involves mental imagery (Beck, 1995, pp. 229-247).
Mental imagery is not verbal.
Finally, a memory structure qualifies as a “belief”
to the extent that is integrated with the cognitive
mechanisms of response production. Thus, cognitive
therapy may target not only the content of a dys-
functional belief (or memory structure), but also its
believability (e.g., Turkington & Siddle, 1998). A
“belief” that is not believed anymore stops being a
belief and becomes a mere “thought” – a cognitive
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content that may still be present in memory but does
not engage behavior anymore. In sum, a coherent
theory of cognitive therapy must include not only a
theory of memory acquisition and modification, but
also a theory of how and when memory structures
affect the guidance of behavior (Brewin, 1988).
Cognition for Behavior Analysts
What kind of concepts could a behavior analyst
use so as to make sense of the empirical track record
of cognitive therapy procedures (e.g. Trower et al.,
2004)? I see profound difficulties with the operant
reinforcement framework in this respect. A main dif-
ficulty concerns the behavior analyst’s reliance on
hypothetical, covert activities. An operant account
of belief modification may start with the assumption
that the “beliefs” modified through cognitive thera-
py consist in private verbal responses. This assump-
tion may seem plausible in some cases. But can
beliefs, even those we can easily “translate” in pub-
lic language, be identified with covert verbal
responses?
The answer is no, for reasons that are well known
(Erwin, 1978) and have been recently brought to the
attention of behavior analysts by Foxall (2007). A
given belief X cannot be identified with a verbal
response (covert or otherwise) because the same
belief or meaning can be expressed by different ver-
bal responses. This is especially obvious in the case
of paraphrasing or translating an expression from
one language to another (Skinner, 1957). In cogni-
tive therapy it is the meaning common to different
utterances, not the utterances themselves, that count
(Alford & Beck, 1997). Trying to salvage a behav-
ioral analysis of meaning by appealing to a response
class instead of a single utterance (e.g., Moore,
2000) has proved unsuccessful, because specifying
the criteria for membership in this “class” seems
impossible unless one again appeals to shared mean-
ings (Anderson & Bower, 1973).
Eventually, an analysis of meaning in terms of
verbal activity must fail because it neglects the cen-
tral role in behavioral guidance of the referents
from which the “meaning” of verbal behavior
derives (for a more detailed discussion of this issue
see Tonneau, 2001). Thus, as Segal (1977) pointed
out, in his treatment of paraphrase Skinner eventu-
ally invoked nonverbal private events so as to avoid
appealing to a form of “knowledge” (p. 650) with
“more abstract status than covert verbal responses”
(p. 651). The fact remains that in order to account
for linguistic meaning the “more abstract,” nonver-
bal events are needed anyway, whether described as
“knowledge” (Segal, 1977), “images” (Wolpe,
1978) or just “cognition” (Wilson, Hayes, &
Gifford, 1997). To this extent, the traditional oper-
ant approach to meaning ends up looking like a
cognitive account in terms of internal symbolic
processes (Segal, 1977).
It is important to understand why the cognitive
and operant models of human behavior converge on
this issue. As their proponents traditionally conceive
them, both are temporally molecular (Rachlin,
1977b, 1988): they consider that psychological phe-
nomena are defined only over an arbitrarily short
temporal interval (typically called, “the present” or
“now”). In the case of a patient who expresses a dys-
functional belief, the therapist finds no obvious
external stimulus that could explain the content of
the patient’s verbal report and be present in the ther-
apeutic session. Accordingly, the therapist infers that
the proximal cause of the verbal report must be
some sort of private event (belief, cognition) inside
the patient.
This shared agreement does not extend to the
mechanisms through which internal beliefs or cog-
nitions are modified. Overreliance on reinforcement
and punishment as processes of behavioral change
means that the empirical properties of belief modifi-
cation procedures are misrepresented in the operant
framework. Two interrelated properties stand out.
First, belief modification procedures are to some
extent holistic instead of elementarist. When suc-
cessful, belief modification entails changes in a
wide class of interrelated activities. These activities
are not random, but bear organized relations to each
other (Delprato, 1986). This does not fit well with
the traditional operant focus on a single response
submitted to reinforcement contingencies (e.g.,
Skinner, 1938). Here is how Rachlin (1983) charac-
terizes the importance of the matching law in oper-
ant research:
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Application of simplistic behavioral theory to
complicated human situations has been the bane
of behavior therapy … [a] great advantage of
Herrnstein’s matching law over previous expres-
sions of the law of effect is that it is less simplis-
tic than those expressions—it takes context into
account. (p. 377).
The matching law (Herrnstein, 1970) is clearly a
step in the right direction in that it incorporates alter-
native responses or context. Nevertheless, the for-
mal relation between the responses included in the
matching equation is just one of physical incompat-
ibility (for example, stepping on the left or on the
right side of the operant chamber). This still is a far
cry from the complex structural and semantic rela-
tions between the utterances that could express the
same underlying “belief.”
A second, related property of cognitive modifica-
tion is that is structure-dependent (Fodor &
Pylyshyn, 1988). In Socratic questioning, for exam-
ple, the environmental events through which cogni-
tive therapists try to modify their patients’ beliefs
consist typically of organized sentences or argu-
ments. These sentences have a semantic and logical
structure that bears some specific relation to the
structure of the beliefs to be modified (Fodor, 1976).
This does not fit well with the concept of operant
reinforcement, in which the respective structural
properties of the response and of the reinforcer are
assumed to be irrelevant (Tonneau, in press).
For these two reasons, the environmental opera-
tions through which cognitive therapists modify
their patients’ beliefs do not bear a close similarity
to the operant relations that hold between respons-
es and consequences. Cognitive therapists typical-
ly assume that a belief must be activated in order
to be modified (Brewin, 1988, p. 65), but modifi-
cation takes place through the structural and
semantic relations between the activated belief and
the therapist’s arguments. The replacement of a
dysfunctional belief by a more adaptive one may
thus superficially look like punishment, in the
sense that the frequency with which the former
belief affects behavior diminishes during therapy.
However, this “punishment” is a consequence of
the structural modification of a belief into another.
The closest analog with respect to instrumental
behavior would be “punishment” in the sense of
Guthrie (1952).
What to Do?
“Belief” is a term from ordinary language.
Nothing in the world may answer to all of the prop-
erties that beliefs are traditionally supposed to have.
Nevertheless, belief phenomena are an important
part of psychological functioning and deserve to be
explained—if not as beliefs, then as “quasi-beliefs,”
scientifically acceptable surrogates for the full-
fledged beliefs of common sense. Currently we have
no fully developed explanation of belief phenome-
na, but remedial steps can be taken.
First and foremost, it is probably a mistake to
look for beliefs or quasi-beliefs as covert activities
inside the patient. To do so only pushes behavior
analysts to endorse an inadequate version of cogni-
tive psychology (Rachlin, 1985), one that is useless
and likely to be false (see above). Remember that
the rationale for looking inside the patient is tempo-
ral molecularism (Rachlin, 1977b): the notion that
the significant causes of behavior must be located at
an arbitrarily short temporal distance from the cur-
rent response.
The alternative is to embrace a molar form of
behavior analysis in which psychological phenome-
na are not tied to any particular temporal interval
(Rachlin, 1974, 1977b). In particular, we should
seriously consider the possibility that beliefs involve
scattered portions of the environment that are sepa-
rated in time from the current response (Tonneau,
2007):
One cannot seek the fountain of youth (…) if
one knows nothing about fountains and nothing
about youth, and one cannot believe anything
about Hobbits unless told that Hobbits are small
human-like creatures with hairy feet. No ordinary
object has all the properties being described
(small, human-like, with hairy feet), but we are
certainly familiar with these properties. We have
encountered them one by one while interacting
with things past. (p. 145).
My suggestion here is that beliefs (or quasi-
beliefs) include temporally distributed properties of
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environmental stimuli as their constituents. This
conceptual framework is a molar one, like Rachlin’s
(1988), but with a focus on the molar environment
rather than molar behavior. Instead of identifying a
thought with an extended behavioral pattern
(Rachlin, 1977a), I identify thoughts with extended
features of the environment, in the tradition of the
philosophical approach to psychology known as
neorealism (for a recent review of neorealism see
Charles, 2011).
It is a challenge to show that all of our beliefs and
concepts, veridical or otherwise, can be traced back
to (and in fact, be constituted by) objective portions
of the environment. Yet convergent evidence on this
point has been provided in the context of “perceptu-
al symbol systems” (Barsalou, 1999) and of the the-
ory of “grounded cognition” (Barsalou, 2008). Here
I propose to replace the “perceptual symbols” of
Barsalou (1999) and the “proxytypes” of Prinz
(2002) by the environmental constituents that these
cognitive surrogates are said to represent.
Consider, for example, the case of patient CE
reported by Chadwick, Lowe, Horne, and Higson
(1994, p. 38). She believed that she was spied on and
that her neighbors pumped poisonous gas through
the wall of her house. What did CE’s belief consist
of? Among other parts, of her previous encounters
with liquids, disease (hence the concept of “poi-
son”), boilers, gas, walls, her house, and her neigh-
bors. Of course her neighbors never pumped gas
through the wall; her belief was nonveridical.
Nevertheless, she encountered all of these compo-
nents at different times in her life history. What dis-
tinguishes CE from a person without delusional
beliefs is not CE’s reacting to something that is not
there, but rather her failure to react to the temporal
gaps between the components of her belief (for fur-
ther discussion see Tonneau, 2011).
Now a sequence of environmental features,
whether temporally connected or not (corresponding
to veridical and nonveridical beliefs, respectively),
qualifies as a belief only if this sequence influences
the patient’s behavior by interacting with other
sequences and other environmental patterns. How
can a therapist modify a belief or decrease its behav-
ioral impact? The first step is to activate the belief in
question, and typically this is done through lan-
guage, be it the patient’s language or the therapist’s
(Ellis, 1969). How language can “activate” a belief
(that is, made it available for modification) and then
modify it is not know in detail, but clearly depends
on the correlations between semantic units of the
therapist’s utterances (typically words) and their
environmental referents (Stemmer, 1973; Tonneau,
2001).
The belief is modified when behavioral control of
the patient’s repertoire shifts from one molar envi-
ronmental sequence to another. At a fundamental
level, none of this is accomplished through operant
reinforcement (although of course reinforcement
can also be useful in therapy). Rather, the process of
belief modification seems to involve structural
changes in controlling sequences through the pres-
entation of stimuli (in this case, words) that have
been correlated with previous environmental con-
stituents.
The relevant behavioral principles have not been
studied in the operant laboratory, and behavior ana-
lysts know little about them. This, however, should
not be taken as a cause for despair but rather as a call
for more basic and applied research, along with
novel theoretical developments (Tonneau, 2007).
Understanding belief modification in cognitive ther-
apy will only be possible if the phenomena in ques-
tion are not prematurely fitted in the straightjacket
of familiar, but in many ways inadequate, theoretical
concepts.
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